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NOTE
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HAGUE:
ABANDONMENT OF MEANINGFUL
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON
CHOICE OF LAW
With the tremendous growth of interstate activity experienced by this country in the last century, theories underlying
both the ability of a state court to entertain lawsuits that have
multi-state contacts and the application of local rules to those
controversies have changed drastically.' Traditional territorial
concepts that restricted the scope of judicial jurisdiction to persons and things located physically within the state, and similarly
restricted legislative jurisdiction2 to particular activities which
took place in the state, have given way to more flexible rules
based upon the contacts a forum has with the parties and the
subject matter of the litigation.3 While the extent to which the
Constitution limits the exercise of jurisdiction over parties has
been the subject of much scrutiny by the Supreme Court in recent years,4 constitutional guidelines applicable to the forum's
choice of law have remained largely undefined. 5
Recently, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,6 the Court was
See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977); R. WEIN.
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
2 The phrase "legislative jurisdiction," as it will be used here, refers to "the power of
a state to apply its law to create or affect legal interests." Reese, Legislative jurisdi'tion,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
3Regarding trends in the judicial jurisdiction area, see Silberman, Shaffer v. Helt-

ner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 39-71 (1978). For an analysis of legislative
jurisdictional trends, see R. LEFLAR, supranote 1, at 105-23.
4 The extent of the applicability of the "minimum contacts" standard first enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), has been explored in
several major decisions since 1977. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5 See text accompanying notes 38-60 infra for a discussion of relatively recent pronouncements by the Court in this area.
6 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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presented with an opportunity to clarify the extent of constitutional limits on the choice of law process and to explain how
those limits relate to the controls on judicial jurisdiction. 7 Hague
involved a dispute over which state's law would determine the
amount of automobile insurance proceeds payable as a result of
the death of the respondent's husband in a motorcycle accident.
The Minnesota Supreme Court8 held that, although- the policy
was issued in Wisconsin to the Hagues, who were Wisconsin
domiciliaries, and although the accident took place in Wisconsin
and involved only Wisconsin residents, Minnesota law could ap-

ply.9 The policy was interpreted differently under Minnesota law
than it would have been interpreted under Wisconsin law, and
the insured party was awarded three times as much as would
have been awarded had the action been brought in Wisconsin.' 0
The Supreme Court affirmed" in a plurality opinion12 written by

Justice Brennan. The opinion stated that there was a "significant
aggregation of contacts" with Minnesota consisting of the decedent insured's employment in Minnesota, the business activity of
Allstate in Minnesota, and the post-accident move of the plaintiff, Mrs. Hague, to Minnesota. The presence of these contacts,
according to the Court, insured that "the application of [Minnesota] law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."'"
The Court's opinion in Hague fails to isolate the underlying
7 Commentators have noted that the Court has failed in the past to analyze adequately the interplay between judicial and legislative jurisdiction. See, e.g., Silberman,
supra note 3, at 80; Comment, At the Intersectionof Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 59
CALIF.L. REv. 1514, 1515 (1971).
8 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979).
9 Id. at 49. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 306-07, for the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision.
10 The Minnesota court interpreted Wisconsin law, as found in Nelson v. Employers
Mut. Casualty Co., 217 N.W.2d 670 (Wis. 1974), to prohibit "stacking," a process which
takes each of the insured's uninsured motorist coverages (in Hague there were three) and
combines them to determine total coverage. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 4748. Minnesota precedents allowed "stacking." See, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut.
Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1973).
11
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302.
12
Justices
White, Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Brenan's opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion. The dissenters were Powell, Burger and
Rehnquist. Justice Stewart did not participate in the decision.
13 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 313-20.
14

Id. at 320.
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rationale which makes these contacts significant, 5 and is therefore of dubious value in delineating the limits on a state court's
choice of law.' 6 In the opinion of this author, however, a far
more serious problem with the decision is that the Court, as a
practical matter, has abandoned any meaningful choice of law
restraints other than judicial jurisdictional controls that currently prevent a court from applying local law by preventing it from
7
hearing the case.'
The discussion which follows will initially show why the
Court's opinion, when viewed in the context of modern developments of constitutional limits on judicial jurisdiction and choice
of law, in effect permits a forum to apply its own law to a controversy without contacts in addition to those required simply to
serve as the forum."8 The unfortunate consequences likely to follow the abandonment of significant choice of law controls, given
the current trend in the conflicts field toward preference for
forum law, will be demonstrated: the unleashing of parochialism
and the concomitant encouragement of forum shopping. 9 In addition, specific situations where the effect of such consequences
will be most pronounced-where judicial jurisdiction is gained
15 The Court's "test" is: "[Flor a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 312-13. The criteria necessary to distinguish significant contacts that create state interests from contacts that are not significant remain unclear.
16 One commentator has stated: "IT]he decision's lack of a clear theoretical underpinning for its aggregation approach renders its precedential value uncertain." Note, Contact-InterestApproach to Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law-Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 11 SETONHALLL. REy. 770,794 (1981).
17 This Note does not take the position that Hague has overturned those cases in
which the Court mandated that a concrete choice of law rule be applied in special circumstances. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965) (intangible property can be escheated only by the state of each creditor's last known address); Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (law of fraternal benefit society's
home state determines members' rights in society-provided insurance); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) (stockholders" rights in an insolvent corporation governed by the
law of the state of incorporation). The opinion in Hague deals only with generally applicable constitutional controls on choice of law.
18 See the text accompanying notes 23-90 infra for development of this point.
19 See the text accompany notes 91-125 infra for a discussion of why choice of law
trends and differing judicial and legislative jurisdictional objectives suggest a need for separate choice of law controls.
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through a defendant's fortuitous presence in a state having little
0
or no contact with the dispute at hand-will be discussed.2
As a solution, this Note suggests that, although ideally a state
court should be precluded from applying local rules of decision to
a case unless that state's interest in the litigation is at least as
strong as another state's competing interest, such an application
of local rules should certainly be precluded unless the state possesses some connection to the specific facts underlying the controversy. 21 The Hague Court's decision, by in essence leaving the
choice of law decision to the local policy of the states, is inconsistent with "the implication of our federal system that the mutual
limits of the states' powers are defined by the Constitution."2
I.

EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

To understand the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Hague, it is necessary to view it both in the context of
evolving constitutional limitations on the powers of courts to exercise judicial jurisdiction (without which they would not have
the opportunity to choose any law), and with regard to the unsettled state of constitutional limitations on legislative jurisdiction at the time the decision was rendered.
A.

JudicialJurisdiction

It is now clear that in order to exercise judicial jurisdiction
under the due process clause23 the forum must have minimum
contacts with the defendant.'ADespite having contacts with the
20 See the text accompanying notes 126-44 infra for a discussion of the consequences
likely to follow from the discarding of significant choice of law controls in specific areas
where the effects of such consequences will be most pronounced.
21 See the text accompanying notes 145-56 infra for this author's conclusion.
22 Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 26 (1945).
' The text of the clause reads: "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. See note 111
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the clauses role in the Court's judicial jurisdiction decisions.
24 "[The due process] clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
319. See Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv.872, 874-76
(1980); Silberman, supranote 3, at 84.
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plaintiff or with factual aspects of the litigation as in Hanson v.

Denckla,25 Shaffer v. Heitner,2 Kulko v. Superior Court,27 and
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 28 forums have been
precluded from exercising judicial jurisdiction when the defen-

dant has not "purposely avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws."' 9
The "minimum contacts" test is, of course, the latest manifestation of the shift in theoretical underpinnings of constitutional limits away from strict territorialism. 0 This shift has in some
instances restricted the states' ability to exercise jurisdiction, but
the overall effect has been the expansion of bases of judicial jurisdiction.3 ' For example, a state can no longer exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a defendant merely because intangible property
he "owns" has its situs in that state, unless he also has minimum
contacts with the state.32 On the other hand, a corporate defendant that transacts business in a variety of places is now amenable to suit in places other than its place of incorporation or principal place of business through application of the minimum contacts test.EI Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
25 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Florida had contacts with beneficiaries, who differed over
whether a power of appointment exercised in Florida by a Florida-domiciled testator was
valid, but no contacts with an indispensable party defendant).
2 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (Delaware had contacts with the defendant's stock, sequestered there through a fictional situs concept, but insignificant contacts with corporate officer defendants who owned the stock).
27 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (California had contacts with the ex-wife, who attempted to
increase child support for her children who lived in California with her, but insignificant
contacts with the defendant father).
28 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Oklahoma had contacts with an accident which took place
within its borders and with the injured plaintiffs, but tenuous contacts with the defendants who distributed and sold the automobile).
29 357 U.S. at 253.
30 For examples of jurisdictions exercised utilizing notions of strict territorialism, see
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
31 See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
32 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186. By an extension of the same logic, it has been argued that a state should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is
temporarily located within its boundaries unless more significant contacts are present as
well. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power"Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
33 See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S.
643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310.
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the contacts need not nebessarily be related to the plaintiffs
cause of action. 34 This availability of alternative forums provides
litigants involved in a significant class of cases with an increased
opportunity for forum shopping.
While the bases of in personam jurisdiction have been expanding, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a
forum's interest in subjecting a defendant to local law is not
enough, in itself, to provide the court with jurisdiction over him.
For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,the Court noted that
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law
to the controversy[,] even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as
an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.3
It is clear that the considerations underlying the ability of a court
to require a defendant to defend and those underlying its ability
to bind him by local laws are recognized as being different.37
These differences in conjunction with expansive trends in personal jurisdiction suggest that, conceptually, a plaintiff could
have a choice of forums, none of which has the interest in seeing
its law applied that another forum, unable to obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant, might have.

34 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
35 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
36 Id. at 294. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 98 ("the fact that California
may be the 'center of gravity' for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that California has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant."); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 215 ("We have
rejected the argument that if a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts
necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute."); Hanson v. Denekla, 357
U.S. at 254 ("[The court] does not acquire ...jurisdiction by being the'center of gravity
of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal
jurisdiction not choice of law.").
37 Cf. 357 U.S. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting) ("True, the question whether the law of
a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question whether the courts of
that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, but the two are often closely related and
to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations."). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 310 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 225 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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LegislativeJurisdiction

The Supreme Court's recent pre-Haguedecisions concerning
constitutional limits on legislative jurisdiction, unlike those cases
in the judicial jurisdiction area, have been few and have lacked
coherence.3 This situation is probably a result of the metamorphosis which has been taking place recently in choice of law

methodology. Whereas fifty years ago the territorialist vested
rights approach dictated application of the law where the cause
of action arose, 39 today in a number of states, courts will apply
forum law whenever there is some discernible local interest in the
case. 4 During the heyday of vested rights, the Supreme Court's
opinions regarding limits on choice of law imposed by the due
process and full faith and credit clauses 41 suggested that the one
proper vested rights law was also constitutionally required.42 It
has been clear for some time now, however, that this position has
18 Commentators have formulated a remarkable diversity of theories in attempting
to explain the cases. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, at 116; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at

505; Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 94, 103-04 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 211 (1976); Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws
and Review by the United States Supreme Court Under the Due ProcessClause, 22 OR. L.
REv. 109, 170 (1943); Reese, supra note 2, at 1596-97; Simson, State Autonomy in Choice
of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 87 (1978).
39 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934).
40 This is the approach espoused initially by the late Professor Brainerd Currie. See,
e.g., B. CURuI, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). However, in his

later writings Currie suggested a softening of this approach. See, e.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW &CONTEMP. PRoB. 754, 763 (1963). Examples of cases where
a state!s interest in a plaintiff provided the sole justification for the application of forum
law include O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978), and Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
41 The text of the full faith and credit clause reads: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Seven members of the Supreme Court in Hague agreed
that the due process and full faith and credit clauses, in conjunction, are the source of limitations on a state's choice of law power, and that a similar analysis should be developed
under both clauses to determine the extent of those limits. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. at 308 n.10 (plurality opinion); id. at 332-36 (Powell, J., dissenting). This procedure
has generally been accepted since Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Justice Stevens,
in his concurring opinion in Hague, however, analyzed the inquiries under the two clauses
separately.
449 U.S. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42
See Dodd, The Powerof the Supreme Court to Review State Decisionsin the Field
of Conflict of Laws, 39 HAv. L. REv. 533 (1926); Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become
a Branch of ConstitutionalLaw?, 15 MiNN. L. REv. 161 (1931).
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been abandoned and that more than one state's law can constitutionally be applied to a case with multi-state contacts.43 What is
not clear is when the contacts become important enough to permit application of a state's rules within constitutional restraints.
In analyzing the focus of the Court's opinions in this area it
becomes apparent that, unlike cases concerning judicial jurisdiction, the Court has not emphasized the forum's relationship with
the defendant. Rather, the relationship between the forum and
the underlying factual elements of the case, and to a lesser extent
that between the forum and the plaintiff, seem significant in
choice of law decisions.44 Prior to the Hague decision it was evident that a plaintiff-forum contact, alone, provided insufficient
justification for imposition of local law. In two early cases generally regarded as viable precedents today by commentators 45
and by the Court itself, 4 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick47 and John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,48 the Court struck
down application of local law by a state forum when the plaintiffs domicile in the state represented its only connection with
the case.
43 Illustrative of the Court's position is the following:

Where more than one State has a sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the
states involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law
of one or another state having such an interest in the multi-state activity.
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971).
44
See Martin, supranote 24, at 876.
45
E.g., R. LEF.AR, supra note 1, at 108-09; Martin, supra note 24, at 878.
46 Both cases are cited with approval and distinguished by the plurality in Hague.
449 U.S. at 309-11. Other decisions from the same era have been disapproved, however.
One case in this category is Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932),
where it was held that only Vermont's workmen's compensation law could apply to a Vermont resident employed in Vermont but killed while temporarily working in New Hampshire. In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. at 412, the Court noted that Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), had "departed" from Clapper.
More recently, in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980),
the Court indicated that "Carroll ... for all intents and purposes buried whatever was
left of Clapper after PacificEmployers..... Another case now disapproved is Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292U.S. 143 (1934), where the
Court struck down application of Mississippi law to a fidelity bond executed in Tennessee
but covering Mississippi-based employees. The Hague Court described that decision as a
vested rights period case which "has scant relevance for today." 449 U.S. at 309 n.11.
47 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
48 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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Dick involved a suit filed in Texas on an insurance contract,
made in Mexico between a Mexican insurance company and a
Mexican domiciliary, which covered a tugboat operated in Mexican waters. The only contact that Texas had with the controversy was that the contract was assigned to Dick, a nominal Texas
domiciliary at the time, who moved to Texas before filing the
action. The Court noted that Dick's residence in Texas was
"without significance." 49
In Yates, an action brought in Georgia on a life insurance
contract entered into in New York, covering a New York domiciliary who died in New York, the only contact was the beneficiary's after-acquired Georgia residence. The Court held that
there was "no occurrence, nothing done to which the law of
Georgia could apply."O Dick and Yates made it clear that a state
needed more than mere contacts with the plaintiff to support application of forum law.
This Note suggests that the common thread which ties the
pre-Haguechoice of law cases together was the requirement of a
connection between the forum and the substantive aspects of the
litigation in order to apply forum law. Such a connection,
though not always emphasized in the Court's opinions, was present in each of these cases. 51In addition, the Court has often noted
U.S. at 408.
50 299 U.S. at 182.
51 In the Court's workmen's compensation cases, the connection has been either the
making of the employment contract in the forum state, Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
330 U.S. 469 (1947) (District of Columbia law can determine recovery allowed for death
of District resident hired by District employer to do work in Virginia, where he was
killed); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (California can apply own law when alien worker hired there was injured in Alaska and returned
afterwards to California), or the occurrence of the accident in the forum state, Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (Arkansas choice of local law upheld where Missouri-based employee
suffered injury on the job in Arkansas); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (California law can be applied when Massachusetts employee injured while temporarily in California).
The occurrence of the accident there has also provided the connecting factor for the
forum state in a tort case. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (California law can determine liability of Nevada for injuries inflicted by Nevada officials on California residents in
49 81

California).
Location of the insured-against loss in the forum constituted a sufficient connection
to apply forum law in cases involving the extent to which a state can regulate insurance
contracts. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (Florida statute of limitations
can be applied to invalidate clause in insurance contract entered into in Illinois, when in-
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the significance of contacts with the particular transaction which
is the subject of the suit. For example, in Watson v. Employers
LiabilityAssurance Corp. ,52 the Court stated:
As a consequence of the modern practice of conducting widespread business activities throughout the entire United States,
this Court has in a series of cases held that more states than one
may seize hold of local activities which are part of the multistate transactions and may regulate to protect interests of its
own people, even though other phases of the same transaction
might justify regulatory legislation in other states.as
Although the Court has not specifically held that the presence of
local activities is a prerequisite to the exercise of legislative jurisdiction, the language used as well as the factual settings in the
pre-Haguecases imply the existence of such a prerequisite.
In the last quarter century, however, the viability of this unarticulated requirement has become uncertain. During this
period, the Supreme Court has said little concerning appropriate
constitutional limitations on choice of law. The last notable preHague case, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,- was decided in
1964 when the vested rights choice of law theory was in the initial stages of its rejection by state courts.s5 The Clay opinion,
written by Justice Douglas, contained only a minimal analysis of
the problem. Clay was an action on the insurance contract execsured moved to Florida before suffering a loss covered there); Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (Louisiana direct action statute can be used to bring
action on insurance contract entered into by out-of-state parties when the insured manufacturer's product caused damage in Louisiana). See also Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943). In Hoopeston, burdensome New York regulations were imposed
upon Illinois insurance associations that insured property located in New York.
52 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
3 Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Accord Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. at 15. For
the text of a relevant portion of the Richardsopinion, see note 43 supra.
5 377 U.S. 179 (1964). A more recent Supreme Court choice of law case is Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, but that decision can be viewed as merely reaffirming an earlier
case, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493. See note
51 supra for a brief description of these cases. The only difference between the cases analytically is that the sister state policy overridden in Hall, Nevada's interest in limiting its
own tort liability, was stronger than the sister state policy overridden in Pacific Employers, Alaska's interest in limiting workmen's compensation recoveries against employers who employed workers there.
S5For example, New York had rejected the vested rights approach only one year
earlier. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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uted in Illinois, but based on a loss which occurred within the insured's after-acquired Florida domicile. The opinion said only
that the activities in Florida were not "too slight and too casual"
to preclude application of the Florida statute of limitations.-"
The most recent Supreme Court decisions which do contain relatively complete discussions on choice of law limitations were rendered nine to ten years earlier than Clay,5 at a time when the
vested rights system was still solidly entrenched in the state
courts.
Additional uncertainty has been generated by the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in ConfederationLife Insurance Co. v.
De LaraI in 1972. There, the Florida courts had applied Florida
law to determine obligations owed under a life insurance contract entered into in Cuba on the life of a Cuban citizen who died
in Cuba but whose beneficiaries lived in Florida. Two dissenting
justices59 observed that Florida had "no relationship to the insurance policy at issue" and that under any reasonable choice-oflaw test it would be difficult to apply Florida law. 0 De Lara is
significant in that the Court was presented with an opportunity
to reaffirm its holdings in Dick and Yates-that a plaintiff's
domicile is insufficient, standing alone, to warrant the application of forum law-but declined to do so.
Likewise contributing to the uncertainty has been the obiter
dicta concerning choice of law issues in recent Supreme Court judicial jurisdiction cases." In Hanson v. Denckla,62 Shaffer v.
Heitner, Kulko v. Superior Court,6 and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,6 the Court states that although the
jurisdictions involved lacked sufficient contacts with the defen377 U.S. at 181-82.
57 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance
Corp., 348 U.S. 66.
5 257 So. 2d42 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 953 (1972).
5
9justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas concurred.
56

60 Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. De Lara, 409 U.S. 953, 955 (1972) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
61 See note 36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of choice of law issues in
the context of judicial jurisdictional decisions.
62 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
6 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977).
6 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
6 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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dants to constitutionally exercise judicial jurisdiction over them,
they may have otherwise had sufficient connections to the facts
to apply local law. 6 Commentators have interpreted the Court's
language as a suggestion that more forum-state contacts are typically needed for the exercise of jurisdiction than for the application of forum law and have questioned the appropriateness of the
gratuitous statements.6 After all, it is reasoned, application of
forum law will affect the substantive interests of the parties to a
greater extent than the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by the
forum. Being forced to litigate in a distant forum will inconvenience a party, but having an unexpected rule of law applied
may jeopardize the ultimate disposition of his case.
Is the Court actually implying that more contacts are needed
for judicial jurisdiction than for legislative jurisdiction? A more
plausible explanation for the seemingly inconsistent treatment of
the two constitutional restrictions is that the Court feels that the
controls placed upon the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by International Shoe and its progeny will adequately protect against an
unrelated state's arbitrary choice of its own law. That is, if a
court unconnected with the facts of a case is prevented from
hearing it, there would be no opportunity for that court to apply
an incongruous rule of law. This approach has been suggested by
Professor Ehrenzweig, who has advocated that the choice of a
forum be restricted to those whose contacts with the case justify
application of forum law. 18However, it is difficult to draw the
6 See note 36 supra and accompanying text for the exact language used by the Court
in these cases.
67 See Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66

KY. L.J. 1, 35-36 (1977-78); Martin, supra note 24, at 879-80; Silberman, supra note 3, at
82-88.
68 See Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a ProperForum:A "Restatement"of the "Lex

Fori Approach," 18 OILA. L. REv. 340, 350 (1965). See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 32.
Two commentators have suggested tightening of judicial jurisdiction standards as one possible way to restrict arbitrary choice of law decisions. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 31, at 1132-33.
Compare the position taken by Justice Black in his concurring opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 323, in which he maintains, essentially, that if
a court can constitutionally apply its own law, it should be able to exercise jurisdiction. If
this were the rule, the constitutional controls on choice of law would provide the only restraint upon arbitrary exercises of judicial jurisdiction by state courts. The problem with
the approach is that the scope of choice of law controls today is unclear. See notes 38-60
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of coherence in this area.
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conclusion that constitutional controls on choice of law are becoming obsolete by extrapolating upon the dictum found within
these judicial jurisdiction cases. Rather, the Court would need to
consider a case where the lower court concededly had judicial
jurisdiction and where only the existence of legislative jurisdiction was in question. This Note suggests that, having been faced
with such a situation in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the
Court is signaling the abandonment of significant choice of law
limits.
II.

THE COURTS OPINION IN HAGUE

In Hague, the Minnesota court indisputably had jurisdiction
over the parties, but its connection with the underlying transactions was tenuous. Although the decedent had procured the insurance while domiciled in Wisconsin, and the accident that
claimed his life took place there, Allstate was amenable to suit on
the policy in Minnesota because the company transacted unrelated business there69 Thus, the Court was squarely presented
with the issue of what additional contacts, if any, a state must

have to apply forum law beyond the "minimum contacts" already necessary for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court identified three Minnesota contacts
which provided a sufficient connection to justify application of
Minnesota law: first, that the decedent was employed in Minnesota; second, that the insurance company did business in MinneInterestingly, Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinions to recent judicial jurisdiction decisions, appears to advocate a position akin to Justice Black's-that the exercise of
judicial jurisdiction should be upheld when the state can constitutionally apply its law. See
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 225 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, through the
Hague opinion Justice Brennan is apparently suggesting that a court should be permitted
to apply forum law virtually any time it can exercise judicial jurisdiction.
69Judicial jurisdiction was obtained in Hague under Minnesota's long arm statute,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West Supp. 1980), which provides in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in
this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation ... in the same
manner as if it were a domestic corporation.... This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation...
(b) Transacts any business within the state....
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sota; and third, that the decedent's wife moved to Minnesota before initiating the lawsuit. 70 Perhaps in an effort to detract attention from the meaninglessness of these individual contacts, the
plurality opinion noted that "[iun the aggregate" the contacts
provided Minnesota with justification for applying its law. 71 Inasmuch as the whole cannot be greater than the sum of its parts, 72
however, an analysis of each of the contacts is necessary. Such an
analysis reveals that, for practical purposes, the Court is requiring no contacts beyond those necessary to permit a state to force
an unwilling party to litigate within its boundaries and that for
choice of law purposes,73 no additional constitutional restraints of
any consequence exist.
With regard to the Minnesota employment contact, the
Court mandates only that the forum state have a contact with
the decedent, whether or not the contact is related to his claim.
Hague's employment was unrelated because his insurance was
not "affected [n]or implicated by [his] employment status,"74 and
because the accident itself did not take place as he was going to or
from work. In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan attempts to
show a relationship by noting the "state concern for the safety
and well-being of its workforce," 75 but auto insurance does not
help assure the employability of Minnesota workers-it merely
assumes that covered parties, regardless of where employed, are
compensated for their losses. 76 The Court is obviously satisfied
with the presence of forum contacts which have, at best, little to
do with the substance of the controversy.
70

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 313-20.
71 Id. at 313.
72 Describing the Hague Court's methodology, one author notes: "The Doctrine that
emerges from the aggregation approach is quite radical: a cluster of individually nonsignificant contacts is significant for constitutional purposes. The otherwise empty contacts
somehow gather content when grouped as a whole." Note, supranote 16, at 787-88.
73 Professor Martin reached the conclusion that Hagueshould be reversed, before the
case was decided by the Court, on the basis of both his proposed minimum contacts approach and traditional standards. See Martin, supra note 24, at 887-88.
74 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 389 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 314.

76 Another possible explanation for the Court's emphasis upon the decedents employment contact, suggested to this writer by Professor John Leathers, University of Kentucky College of Law, is that the Court was dissatisfied with the concept of domicile as
presently defined and felt that the Minnesota employment made Hague a quasi-Minnesota
domiciliary.
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The control over a state's ability to apply local law provided
by the requirement of an unrelated contact is minimal at best.
There are possibly infinite irrelevant contacts that a court could
seize upon to justify the application of forum law. Vague state interests furthered thereby could always be unearthed. For
example, the presence of virtually any close relatives of the dece-

dent Hague in Minnesota could support the application of Minnesota law if the court notes a possibility that those relatives
would have to provide for Hague if he were injured, or for his
immediate family if he were killed, and that the insurance coverage provided under sister state law was insufficient.
It could be maintained that a requirement of an unrelated
forum contact at least prevents application of the law of a forum
chosen by a plaintiff with no contacts. In practice, however, it is
highly unlikely that even a state which favors the application of
its law will want to apply it simply because a non-resident chose
the forum. In most instances, the state would refuse to hear the
case through theforum non conveniens doctrine' 7 Thus, the unrelated Minnesota employment contact stressed as a limiting factor in Hague does not perceptibly alter a state forum's ability to
apply the law of its choice.
The second contact noted in Hague, the insurer's presence in
Minnesota, is, of course, the same contact needed by Minnesota
to exercise judicial jurisdiction over Allstate."8 No additional restrictions are placed upon the forum's ability to apply its own law
by a precondition that such a contact exist. Absent minimum
contacts between the forum and the defendent, that state forum
would not have the opportunity to apply its own law because
constitutional limits upon judicial jurisdiction would preclude it
from hearing the case to begin with.
Finally, regarding the plaintiff's post-accident move to Minnesota, much like the decedent's Minnesota employment, the
Court articulates only another unrelated contact requirement.
The plaintiffs post-accident move is plainly irrelevant to the
77 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
78

The contact requirement, as described in the judicial jurisdiction context, is "that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
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question of which state's rules should be applied to the legal issues involved in a suit upon that accident. 9 As is the case with
forum-employment contacts, a requirement that a plaintiff have
established a contact with the forum at a point in time after the
claim arose does not provide a meaningful limit upon a state's
ability to apply its own law. Of course, this requirement will prevent a state from applying its law when a non-resident litigant
sues there provided there are no other contacts. Constitutional
limitations aside, even a forum which tends to apply forum law
whenever it has some interest in the case will not be inclined to
do so when its only contact with the plaintiff is his choice of that
court. Thus, the forum's desired choice of law will not be discernibly restricted by the requirement that the state have an unrelated contact such as the plaintiffs after-acquired domicile.
That significant constitutional choice of law controls have
now been discontinued becomes apparent when the earlier Supreme Court cases which limited state court choice of law, Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick 8 and John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, 81 are reexamined in the light of Hague. Although Justice Brennan purports to distinguish Yates 82 it is clear
that Hague overrules it.8 The cases are almost identical. In both,
the decedent-husband had been insured and had died in one
state, but the plaintiff-wife had moved to another state before
filing suit on an insurance policy (the only difference being that
in Yates a life insurance policy instead of an auto policy was involved). The dissent in Hague noted another similarity-that the

79 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See the text accompanying note 49 supra for a brief synopsis
of the facts of the case.
81 299 U.S. 178 (1936). See the text accompanying note 50 supra for a brief description of the facts of the case.
82 See 449 U.S. at 310-11.
83 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, seems to appreciate the similarities between Hague and Yates; he notes that the latter case "was one of a series of constitutional
decisions in the 1930's that have been limited by subsequent cases." Id. at 325 n.11
(Stevens, J., concurring). However, the majority opinions in the cases cited by Justice
Stevens as supporting his contention that Yates was no longer valid at the time of the
Hague decision contain no references to Yates. The only reference to Yates at all in the
cases cited by Justice Stevens appears in a dissentingopinion where the case is merely mentioned in a general discussion. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. at 416 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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defendant insurance company in Yates did business in the forum

state,84 a contact stressed in the Hague plurality opinion but considered meaningless for choice of law purposes in Yates.85 The
only factual difference between the two cases is the presence in

Hague of an additional unrelated 86 contact-the decedent's employment in Minnesota. However, considering the emphasis that

the Court in Yates placed upon the absence of a connection between the Georgia forum and the subject matter-the insurance

contract sued upon 7 -it is doubtful that an unrelated contact
would have altered the outcome of Yates. Moreover, it is possible
in Yates that some family ties did actually exist between the
plaintiff-wife and Georgia, and that the insurance company
could have anticipated her move there in the event of her hus-

band's death. Under the Court's analysis in Yates the existence of
such an unrelated contact would have been irrelevant. The ruling of the Court in Hague, however, given the similarity of the

facts in the case to those in Yates and the different result, indicates that forum contacts with the substance of the litigation are
no longer necessary to justify the application of forum law.
Dick, while not overturned by Hague,88 has lost its signif84 Cited by Justice Powell was THE INSURANCE ALMANAC 715 (1935). 449 U.S. at 338
n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing Yates).
8 The Court in Yates did not think the fact important enough to even warrant mention. See 449 U.S. at 338 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("This Court did not hint in Yates that
[the] fact [that the insurance company did business in the forum state] was of the slightest
significance to the choice-of-law question .... ).
80 See the text accompanying notes 74-76 supra for an explanation of why this contact is unrelated to the claim.
87 "In respect to the accrual of the right asserted under the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence, nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could apply."
299 U.S. at 182.
8 The contacts that Texas had with the dispute in Dick were significantly more tenuous than those in Hague. For example, the insurer with whom Dick's predecessor contracted had never done any business in Texas. See 281 U.S. at 402. However, much of the
language in Dick appears inconsistent with the essence of the Court's opinion in Hague. In
discussing the extent to which a state could affect the terms of a contract, the Court in
Dick said:
A State may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making of certain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit performance within its
borders, even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are required to be
performed within the State and their performance would violate its laws. But,
in the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the
contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in
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icance because the fact situation in the case could not arise today.
In Dick, jurisdiction was obtained quasi-in-rem over the reinsurers of Dick's policy by garnishing their reinsurance obligation.89 Since this method of obtaining judicial jurisdiction over
defendants was declared unconstitutional in Rush v. Savchuk,9o
the Court, today, would affirm the result in Dick (Texas cannot
apply Texas law), but for a different reason: no constitutional
controls on choice of law would be necessary because the judicial
jurisdiction controls would prevent Texas from hearing the case
initially.
The effect of evolving judicial jurisdictional concepts upon a
state's opportunity to apply its own law, as illustrated by conceptualizing Dick in a present-day setting, helps explain the Court's
position in Hague. The Court appears to be saying that limits
upon the exercise of state court jurisdiction set by the minimum
contacts standard provide adequate protection against irrational
selection of applicable law.
III.

THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
ON CHOICE OF LAW

To understand the impact of Hague's virtual abandonment
of constitutional restraints upon choice of law, the case must be
viewed' in the context of a trend in many states toward favoring
forum law. In light of this trend, this author suggests that the
Court's decision in Hague was shortsighted. Because the goal of
interstate allocation of judicial business sought to be achieved by
judicial jurisdictional rules differs from the goal of interstate allocation of the states' substantive policies sought to be achieved by
choice of law rules, separate choice of law restraints are still
needed.91
Texas ....

At all times here material, [Dick] was physically present and act-

ing in Mexico.
Id. at 407-08.
89 Id. at 402. This is essentially the same procedure through which judicial jurisdiction was obtained in Seider v. Roth, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
90 444 U.S. 320 (1980). The Supreme Court in Hague notes in reference to Dick that

"[t]here would be no jurisdiction in the Texas Courts to entertain such a lawsuit today."
449 U.S. at 310 n.12.
91 Cf. Sedler, JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031 (1978) (maintaining that the constitutional dimensions
of judicial jurisdiction and choice of law should be fully co-extensive).
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Trends Toward PreferenceforForum Law

A.

It is ironic that controls on choice of law have been virtually
eliminated at a time when state courts are becoming less inhibited about choosing the law they prefer and, in the process, are
abandoning traditional choice of law theories. In attempting to
fill the void left by their renunciation of the vested rights principles of the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 92 courts
have been less enamoured of interest-balancing approaches suggested by some theorists93 and have tended to prefer their own
variations of the "governmental interests" theory first espoused
by the late Professor Brainerd Currie. 4 According to Currie's
theory, if a forum state's connection with the dispute gives it a
"legitimate interest," its law can be applied, even if another
state's interests are arguably more important s (and even if the
other state would have applied local law if the case had been litigated there). Typically, state courts have not adhered consistently to one theoretical approach, but have chosen ad hoc from
among the various "scholarly camps."9 Currie's theory has been
appealing, primarily because of its preference for forum law. It
is, after all, easier for a state judge to apply local law than to interpret and apply that of another state.
Conflicts decisions from Kentucky and from New York exemplify the trend toward application of forum law. Kentucky's
highest court concluded that "the conflicts question should not
be determined on the basis of a weighing of interests, but simply
on the basis of whether Kentucky has enough contacts to justify
applying Kentucky law." 7 This proposition was utilized in Fos92 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
9 The most prominent approach is that of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAwS (1971), and of its reporter Professor Willis Reese. See id. §§ 145, 188, 222.
See also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 959

(1952).

94 See note 40 supra and note 95 infra for examples of Professor Curries work.
95 See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE
L.J. 171, 177, reprintedin CutouE. SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183

(1963).

96 See R. LEFLaR, supranote 1, at 197.

97 Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968) (emphasis in original). In
Arnett, a wife sued her husband for injuries she received while a passenger in a car he was
driving which was involved in an accident in Kentucky. Both were Ohio domiciliaries. Al-
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ter v. Leggett" to reject an Ohio guest statute defense of an Ohio-

domiciled
killed his
Kentucky
tionships"

driver who was involved in an Ohio accident that
Kentucky passenger. The Court noted as significant
contacts that the driver worked and had "social relain Kentucky. 91 Since an Ohio court would have ap-

plied its guest statute in the same situation,

0

it is apparent that

Kentucky's preference for forum law increases the possibility that
the outcome in a particular case will vary according to whether

the suit is initiated in Kentucky or elsewhere.
In New York, similar consequences flow from that state's recent trend toward favoring recovery for New York-domiciled
plaintiffs' 0' regardless of where they happen to be injured and regardless of other interested states' inconsistent policies designed
to limit defendants' liability.0 2 The application of New York law,
under New York choice of law rules, to benefit local plaintiffs is
o In that case, a
illustrated by O'Connorv. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.10
New York domiciliary was injured by a Virginia corporate defendant in Virginia. The plaintiffs sole remedy under Virginia law
though Ohio did not allow tort actions between husband and wife and also had a guest
statute precluding recovery, the Kentucky court applied Kentucky law on the grounds
that the accident occurred in Kentucky.
Is 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). For a discussion of the Fostercase, see Symposium on
Fosterv. Leggett, 61 Ky. L.J. 367 (1972-73).
99 484 S.W.2d at 829. The Kentucky court apparently obtained judicial jurisdiction
over the defendant through personal service on him while he was temporarily within Kentucky.
A federal district court sitting in Kentucky applied Kentucky law in a case with similar facts. See Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
For a case in another jurisdiction with a conclusion opposite to that of Foster see
Cipollav. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970).
'00 See 484 S.W.2d at 831 (Reed, J., dissenting).
101 New York, unlike Kentucky, has exhibited a preference for forum law only when.
local plaintiffs are involved. Thus, in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), an
action for the wrongful death of an Ontario resident who died in an Ontario accident
while a guest in a New York resident's car, the New York Court of Appeals held that Ontario's guest statute precluded liability.
102 A good summary of the New York cases in this area is found in Roseithal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), a diversity case. In Rosenthal, a wrongful death action
was brought in New York against a physician who had performed an operation on the
New York decedent in Massachusetts. Although under Massachusetts law recovery was
limited to $50,000, the Second Circuit held New York law applicable because of that
state's policy of "fully compensating the harm from wrongful death." Id. at 445.
For a critique of Rosenthal, see Reese, supranote 2, at 1605-06.
103 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
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was provided by that state's workmen's compensation statute.
The Second Circuit, applying the New York conflicts rules in a
diversity action,' held that New York law, which permitted a
tort action, was properly utilized by the district court. The tenuous nature of the forum contacts in O'Connorbecomes evident
by looking at how jurisdiction over the defendant corporation
(which had no contacts with New York) was obtained by garnishing obligations to insure it under Seider v. Roth.0 5 But for
the fortuitous circumstance that the defendant's insurer's presence in New York gave New York judicial jurisdiction, the plaintiff would have been forced to bring the action in Virginia,
where her recovery would have been limited.'16
Choice of law systems such as Kentucky's and New York's
that significantly favor forum law will inevitably promote forum
shopping, and if a litigant succeeds in obtaining a favorable judgment in one forum, the full faith and credit clause mandates that
a sister state recognize the judgment.' ° The possibility that a sister state may have had a superior interest in the litigation and
would not have considered applying any law but its own demonstrates the need for controls at the choice of law level. In an age
of increasing commercial interdependence, some judicial consistency among the states is necessary to maintain the willingness of
individuals to participate in interstate dealings. 108

104 This is mandated by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

105 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). This method of obtaining jurisdiction quasi-in-rem has
now been discredited. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320.
106 In other cases, the application of New York rules, when New York had extremely
limited contacts with the controversy, has produced results inconsistent with the probable
outcome of the case had it been litigated elsewhere. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475
F.2d 438 (see note 102 supra for a description of this case); Holzsager v. Valley Hospital,
482 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (New Jersey charitable immunity was not applied in a
suit against a hospital by a wife for injuries suffered when her husband died while both resided within New Jersey; the wife moved to New York prior to filing suit); Miller v. Miller,
290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) (Maine limit on wrongful death recovery not applied when a
New York resident was killed in Maine in a vehicle operated by his Maine-domiciled
brother who subsequently moved to New York).
10
7 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
108 See Reese, supranote 2, at 1606-07.
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B. The Differing Objectives of Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction Controls
Is a separate set of constitutional controls on choice of law
really necessary to prevent forum shopping? In many instances,
the "minimum contacts" limits upon judicial jurisdiction do prevent blatant forum shopping. If a case with the facts of O'Connor"9 arose today, a forum having no connection with the defendant would be precluded from applying its law by the jurisdictional "minimum contacts" requirement." 0 However, problems
exist that are not resolved by the tightening of judicial jurisdiction controls. Generally, the concern in both the choice of forum
and choice of law areas is one of rationally allocating judicial
business in a federal system; but the specific goals sought to be attained in the respective areas differ.
In the area of judicial jurisdiction, constitutional limits focus
on fair treatment of the defendant and insure against the burden
of litigating in a distant forum with which the defendant has no
contacts."' In contrast, choice of law limits have traditionally
focused upon contacts between the forum and the factual elements of the case,112 suggesting an interest in the obligation of one
state to respect the rights of sister states to govern within their respective spheres of influence. 113 Thus, a forum which lacked contacts with the factual elements of the controversy was not necessarily precluded from exercising judicial jurisdiction, provided
the requisite defendant-forum contacts were present, but the
forum could not apply its own law to that controversy. This distinction between judicial and legislative jurisdictional interests
has intuitive appeal. For example, if a dispute arises between
109 See note 103 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of O'Con-

nor.
110 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320.

111 The Supreme Court, in InternationalShoe, stated: "[The due process clause] does
not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 326

U.S. at 319. See Martin, supra note 38, at 202-03. Cf. Reese, supra note 2, at 1591. Reese
argues that the basic principle underlying judicial jurisdiction has both a fairness and a

federalism component.
112 See note 51 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of

this type of contact in the Court's choice of law decisions.
113 See Martin, supra note 38, at 202-03.
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two parties from activities undertaken by each within the state of
New York, and both parties later moved to California, the more
convenient forum is California, and that state should be free to
entertain the lawsuit. However, because the events had ramifications only within New York and only New York has an interest in
regulating them, New York law should be applied to the merits
of the controversy.
The distinction between the functions of controls on judicial
jurisdiction and controls on choice of law also manifests itself in
the underlying constitutional doctrine. While the due process
clause has always provided the foundation for the Supreme
Court's judicial jurisdiction decisions,1 4 the Court has relied on
both due process 15 and full faith and credit" 6 in its choice of law

opinions.
Some observers maintain that the full faith and credit clause
alone better explains the rationale behind choice of law limits. 117
Professor James Martin has argued that the due process clause,
with its emphasis on the relationship between the state and the
individual, is typically not offended when a state with jurisdiction over the parties applies an otherwise irreproachable local
law."8 Local laws are applied regularly with no contention that
the laws, in and of themselves, are fundamentally unfair. Any
notion that such laws cannot be applied to out-of-state activities
because due process leaves the forum state without "power" to
affect transactions taking place outside its boundaries is pre-

114 The initial case to identify due process as the doctrinal basis for judicial jurisdictional control was Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 733, although the fourteenth amendment
was not ratified until 1868, subsequent to the time that Neff's property was attached and
sold pursuant to judgment.
115
See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397.
116 See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178.
117 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 38; Comment, supra note 7, at 1532-39. But see
Kirgis, supra note 38, at 94 (disagreeing with Martin's analysis); Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151 (1977).
Most observers, however, have treated the two clauses together, though they typically assign different functions to the clauses. See, e.g., Cheatham, FederalControl of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 584 (1953); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice
of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. CHI. L. REV.9, 13, 83
(1958); Weintraub, Due Processand Full Faithand CreditLimitationson a State's Choice
of Law, 44 IowA L. REv.449, 490 (1959).
118 See Martin, supra note 38, at 202-03.
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eluded by contemporary judicial jurisdiction decisions. 119 In most
cases, because the parties are generally unaware of the varying
content of each state's laws, there is no reliance on the laws of
any particular state that requires the protection of due process. 11
Rather, the interests that are offended by the application of the
law of an unrelated state are the regulatory rights of the related
state or states that the full faith and credit clause was meant to
protect. The basic postulate of our federal system is state sovereignty, which "presupposes that each state will be permitted to
effectuate, to the extent consistent with the identical right of
every other state, the policies it adopts."'' When a sister state's
policies are superceded by an unrelated forum's mere preference
for local law, its rights under the full faith and credit clause are
denied.
Controls, apart from those on judicial jurisdiction, are necessary to protect a state's interest in furthering its own substantive
policies. There is nothing improper in one state's exercising judicial jurisdiction over litigation centered in another state if that
forum is more convenient for the parties. The interested state's
concern is not with the location of the litigation; it may very well
prefer, because of congestion and expense considerations, that
the case not be litigated within its own court system. However,
an unrelated forum's decision to apply its own substantive law in
this situation (perhaps merely because it is simpler to do so) presents an entirely different situation. The interested state's substantive policies are ignored, yet such action on the part of the
forum cannot be prevented by the controls upon judicial jurisdiction alone.
An illustration of the danger inherent in combining the judicial jurisdiction and choice of law analyses is presented by Alton
v. Alton, 22 a case concerning permissible bases of divorce juris-

119See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 310.

0 An exception arises when the parties explicitly contract that a particular rule of
law, other than that of the forum, shall be applicable. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397.
121 Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1963)
(emphasis added).
122 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated asmoot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
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diction. 121 There, a majority of the Third Circuit held that the
Virgin Islands Legislature could not give its courts judicial jurisdiction over divorce actions based solely upon both parties'
voluntary appearance before the court.' i 4 The Alton court
reasoned that the traditional basis of divorce jurisdiction-domicile of one of the parties-was constitutionally required by due
process. The majority's holding ignored the distinction between
the due process-judicial jurisdiction aspects and the full faith and
credit-choice of law aspects underlying the case. As Judge Hastie
pointed out in his dissent, no one's due process rights were infringed upon when the parties willingly submitted to the court's
jurisdiction. 12 The proper resolution of an Alton situation would
be to uphold judicial jurisdiction but require application of the
law of an interested state-a jurisdiction where one or the other
party is domiciled. Thus, the action would be heard in a forum
convenient to the parties, but that unrelated forum would be unable to override the policies of sister states having substantive interests in the case.
C. ProblemAreas: Where Controlson JudicialJurisdictionAre
Inadequate
If a court's ability to apply forum law is limited only by the
minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of judicial jurisdic123 Divorce proceedings have traditionally been considered in rein actions, utilizing
a fiction that the marital relationship is a res having its situs at the married parties' domicile. Thus these proceedings have been analyzed separately from non-divorce cases. See R.
LEFLAR, supranote 1, at 455. This Note takes the position that, nonetheless, a useful analogy can be drawn between what has transpired in the divorce area concerning judicial
jurisdiction/choice of law distinctions and what could possibly occur in other areas as a result of the Hague decision.
124 The court in Alton analyzed Bill No. 55, 17th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin
Islands (1953) (amending § 9 of the Divorce Law of 1944), which it found provided:
[I]f the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the complaint
and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be
prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been personally
served within the district or enters a generalappearancein the action, then the
Court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or
the cause of action arose.
207 F.2d at 669 (emphasis added).
125 207 F.2d at 680 (Hastie, J., dissenting).
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tion, situations will arise wherein that court is free to choose
local law despite a lack of contacts with the operative events giving rise to the claim. As a result, forum shopping opportunities
may increase dramatically unless constitutional limits on choice
of law are imposed. Situations most vulnerable to abuse in the
absence of choice of law limits are those in which a corporation
transacts business, unrelated to the litigation, within a number
of states, and those involving an individual defendant's postoccurrence move from the state where the controversy is centered
6
to an unrelated forum state.1

The Hague case itself illustrates the heightened potential for
forum shopping in controversies which involve a multi-state corporation.' 2 7 In Hague, the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, transacted business in all fifty states. 2 The plaintiff
moved to one of these states, which afforded her a greater measure of recovery, 29 and the Court held that the application of
local law by the new state was permissible. The Court explained
its rationale by quoting Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.:1ss
"'Particularly since the company was licensed to do business in
[the forum], it must have known it might be sued there, and that
[the forum] courts would feel bound by [forum] law."",, 3 However, it is neither foreseeable nor desirable that a forum in which

a corporate defendant merely transacts unrelated business should
impose its substantive policies upon activities that took place
completely within other jurisdictions. 132
126 Forum shopping opportunities are not necessarily limited to plaintiffs. In some
circumstances, a party with potential liability would be able to "shop" for a declaratory
judgment which would later be entitled to ares judicata effect.
127 See the text accompanying notes 6-14 supra for a brief outline of the facts in
Hague.

128 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 The Hague plurality opinion notes that there was no indication that the change
of residence was motivated by litigation considerations. 449 U.S. at 319 n.28. However,
the discovery of the moving party's subjective intent would be, in many cases, difficult if
not impossible.
130 377 U.S. 179 (1964).

131 449 U.S. at 318 (quoting 377 U.S. at 182). The language originally appeared in
Justice Black's dissent in the Court's first opinion in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S.
207, 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting), where the lower court's decision was vacated and
the case remanded to obtain an authoritative construction of state law. In the final Clay
decision the majority adopted Black's language into the Court's opinion. 377 U.S. at 182.
13 [J]urisdiction founded upon "doing business" within a state is likely to re-
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An illustration of the problem, suggested by Professor Martin, centers around the potential liability of an airline as a result
of an airplane crash.' 33 The mere possibility that the accident
could have taken place anywhere within several hundred miles
of the scheduled route should not give a nearby state sufficient
justification to apply its own law in favor of survivors that are or
later become local residents. The minimum contacts between a
corporation and a forum which enable that forum to exercise judicial jurisdiction are often totally unrelated to the corporation's
dealings with its trial adversary and do not adequately protect
against arbitrary choices of forum law.
An additional factor in the multi-state corporate context reveals the inadequacy of the jurisdictional minimum contacts test
as a choice of law control: a state's ability to apply forum law is
dependent upon the length of its long arm statute. A litigant's attempt to forum shop for substantive law will be successful if the
chosen forum has passed legislation permitting it to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of unrelated contacts.
Examples of such long arm statutes are found in those states that
permit the assertion of jurisdiction whenever constitutionally
permissible,'3 4 or in states such as Minnesota that permit such an
assertion whenever a corporation transacts any business within
the state. ' Those litigants whose chosen forum lacks the statutory authority necessary to assert judicial jurisdiction are not
given the same opportunity to forum shop for substantive law.
Moreover, it is possible that the state with the greatest connection to and interest in a controversy will be unable, statutorily, to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, while another
state with mere unrelated defendant contacts (sufficient to exercise judicial jurisdiction) is free to invoke its substantive law, al-

quire the defendant to defend against claims unrelated to the forum. It is a
significant extension of this doctrine to hold that the defendant's rights and
liabilities arising from the non-forum related claim may be adjudicated according to the law of the forum.
Note, supra note 16, at 793.
133 See Martin, supranote 24, at 887.
134 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (1969).
135 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West Supp. 1980). See note 69 suprafor the pertinent language of this statute.
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though it has no connection with the actual controversy.136 As an
alternative, the exercise of judicial jurisdiction could be limited
to those situations in which the forum has contacts with the facts
underlying the litigation, but such an alternative fails to satisfy
the fairness objectives of judicial jurisdictional controls. 137If the
forum suits the convenience of the parties it should be free to
hear the case. It is not the exercise of jurisdiction, but rather the
forum's choice of law in such a case that should be regulated.
Analogous to the multi-state corporate context are those situations wherein judicial jurisdiction is obtained over an individual defendant based upon his or her presence in the forum sometime after the claim arose for reasons unrelated to the claim. The
defendant is either served while temporarily within the forum
state or served after changing his or her domicile to that state.
Post-occurrence relocation of defendants exposes, in many instances, the inadequacy of judicial jurisdictional controls for
choice of law purposes. Jurisdiction over transients who lack
minimum contacts'31 poses less difficulty as it is likely to be de4
clared unconstitutional3 9 in the wake of the Shaffer v. Heitner' 0
expansion of "minimum contacts" to jurisdiction based on the
presence of unrelated property; however, inherent choice of law
problems will continue to arise when a state exercises jurisdiction
over a defendant whose minimum contact is an unrelated afteracquired domicile. For example, in Miller v. Miller,'4' New York acquired jurisdiction over the defendant because he fortuitously
(for the plaintiff, at any rate) moved to New York after being involved in a traffic accident. The accident occurred in Maine, the
defendant's domicile at the time, and claimed the life of the
plaintiff's decedent, who was a passenger in the defendant's car.
136 See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964) (Oregon defendant defaulted on notes executed in California with Calfornia plaintiff who had no contacts with
Oregon; plaintiff was forced to sue in Oregon because the long arm statute in force at the
time in California was not broad enough to give its courts jurisdiction over the defendant).
137 See note 111 supra and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the objectives
sought to be obtained by such controls.
S138See,
e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (the difendant was served with process while flying over Arkansas in an airplane and judicial jurisdiction was upheld).
139 See Sedler, supranote 91, at 1035.
140 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
141 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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Although the defendant's only contacts with New York arose
after the operative events took place, and although those events
refused to
took place entirely within Maine, the New York forum
42
apply Maine's limit upon wrongful death recovery.
Miller clearly illustrates that the law applied to a case should
not depend upon fortuitous party relocations in the interim between the accrual of the claim and service of the complaint.
Again in this context, a rule making the defendant amenable to
43
suit within the state of his domicile regardless of other contacts
is not the offensive element. The rule is a valid one because it secures one place where the defendant is always subject to suitcreating a type of residual jurisdiction.144 The problem, ultimately, is in the inadequate protection provided by judicial jurisdictional controls against a forum's arbitrary and unfair choice of
law. Only separate constitutional limits on a state's choice of law
can prevent that arbitrary unfairness.

IV.

REIMPOSING CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS
ON CHOICE OF LAW

Assuming that controls beyond those provided by judicial
jurisdictional minimum contacts are needed to limit a state's
choice of law, a question remains regarding the proper form of
those controls. Although reform could conceivably be accomplished through a number of agencies other than the Supreme
Court, 14 this Note will concentrate on judicially imposed solutions. The Court is the only agency through which universal
choice of law limits have been imposed in the past. Possible limit142

An additional motivation for the court's decision was that Maine had repealed its

limit in the interim between the accident and the trial. Id. at 742.

143 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
144 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 31, at 1179.
145 An example is uniform legislation in narrowly defined substantive areas. See,
e.g., UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACr § 7 (1952 version) ("Duties of
support applicable under this law [act] are those imposed or imposable under the laws of
any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support.is sought.")

U.C.C. § 9-102 (1962 version) ("[Tlhis Article applies so far as concerns any personal
property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state .... ).
Other suggested vehicles of reform include Congress, see Horowitz, The Commerce
Clause as a Limitation on State Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARv. L. REv. 806 (1971),
and interstate compacts, see Comment, supra note 7, at 1545-47.
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ing approaches include: a return to the pre-Hague emphasis on
the state's justifiable regulatory interests suggested by cases such
as Watson; a balancing approach designed to pinpoint the most
interested state; and a modified minimum contacts approach,
with the operative contacts being those contacts with the facts
underlying the litigation.
The disadvantage of the pre-Hague approach was its characteristic vagueness. A methodology could not be extracted from
inconsistent cases to determine when "the activities in the State
of the forum [became] too slight and too casual . ..to make application of local law consistent with due process."' 146 The preHague cases were susceptible to such a variety of interpretations147 that the Court in Hague was able to rely on, for example,
cases such as Dick and Yates which are at the very least opposed
in spirit to the decision reached in Hague.48 For practical purposes, any choice of law guidelines provided before Hague were
limited to the specific fact situations in the few cases heard by the
Court.
A balancing of the different states' interests was suggested as
a way of limiting arbitrary choice of law in Alaska PackersAss'n
v. IndustrialAccident Commission.4 Such a weighing process is
more in harmony than other approaches with the theory of
limited state sovereignty within the federal system that the full
faith and credit clause was designed to insure. 50 However, the
process of assigning varying weights to ephemeral state interests
has proven difficult if not impossible. The preference of state
courts in Professor Currie's anti-balancing theories'5 ' as opposed
to the more complicated balancing approaches suggested by
others52 indicates the difficulties courts have had with a weigh146

Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. at 181-82.

147See note 38 suprafor examples of theories offered by commentators to explain the

cases.

148 See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text for an evaluation of these cases in
light of Hague.
149294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See also the gratuitous language to this effect in Watson
v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. at 73 ("[Massachusetts' interests] cannot
outweigh the interest of Louisiana in taking care of those injured in Louisiana.").
150 See notes 117-21 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of why the full
faith and credit clause better explains the rationale behind choice of law limits.
151 See notes 40 & 95 supra for examples of Professor Currie's work.
152 See note 93 suprafor some of the sources of such theories.
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ing process. Adoption of a balancing method would also necessitate disapproving the language in contemporary Supreme Court
choice of law cases'o stating that more than one state's law can
constitutionally be applied to cases with interstate connections.
Some degree of inconsistency in the outcome of cases depending
on where they are litigated is unavoidable; it is impossible to
neatly characterize truly interstate transactions as being primarily associated with one rather than another state.
Perhaps the most workable proposal for constitutional controls upon choice of law is the quasi-minimum contacts approach
suggested by Professor Martin.'-" Under his approach, a forum
can apply local law only if it has contacts with the underlying
substance of the controversy. 1- Thus, a state having the ability to
exercise judicial jurisdiction based on unrelated contacts with the
defendant would not be permitted to apply forum law. Interested states, therefore, would be protected against arbitrary application of forum law when the forum state is unconnected to
the transaction. This approach, because it is similar mechanically to the judicial jurisdiction minimum contacts test, facilitates a
proper application by state courts. It is, as Professor Martin
points out, also reconcilable with the Supreme Court's choice of
law opinions prior to Hague. 5 6 Adoption of this approach would
not prevent forum shopping entirely in cases with multiple state
contacts, but would effectively preclude those blatant instances
of forum shopping wherein the chosen forum has no contacts
with the facts underlying the claim.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, rather than utilizing Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague's5 as a vehicle to promulgate workable constitutional limits upon a state's choice of law, has for all practical purposes abandoned such controls. In view of its decision, the Court
apparently believes that existing controls on the power of a state

153 E.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. at 412.
154

See Martin, supra note 24.

1'5 Id. at 873.

l5 Id. at 883-86.
157

449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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to exercise judicial jurisdiction will adequately protect against
the arbitrary application of forum law by jurisdictions having no
factual contacts with the case. However, the Court overlooks the
distinction between the objectives underlying controls on judicial
jurisdiction, and those underlying controls on choice of law.
While it is undeniably fair to require a defendant to litigate in a
forum from which he has derived benefits, it is unreasonable,
when the suit involves a transaction unrelated to the forum, to
allow that forum to ignore the substantive policies of sister states.
Yet now, in light of Hague, not only can a state force a defendant
to litigate in its tribunals, it can also, on the basis of contacts unrelated to the transaction, subject a defendant to local law.
The Court's decision represents the adoption of a laissez-faire
attitude at a time when more restraint upon arbitrary state action is needed. Recently, state courts have become less inhibited
in applying forum law, regardless of the conflicting policies of interested states and regardless of the lack of contacts with the circumstances of the claim. The absence of meaningful control in
Hague can only be encouraging to those litigants (and their attorneys) who are in the market for a forum willing to apply a law
more sympathetic to their claims or defenses. Assuming that
multi-state activity will inevitably increase, resulting in additional cases involving choice of law problems, the Court's decision in
Hague signals an unacceptable retreat toward a parochial states'
rights view of federalism. Hopefully, however, this case is merely
an aberration and the Court will reimpose choice of law controls
which require that the forum state have some relationship to a
controversy before it can apply local substantive rules to the
resolution.
Richard W. Mattson

